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Twin-Field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) can beat the linear bound of repeaterless QKD
systems. After the proposal of the original protocol, multiple papers have extended the protocol
to prove its security. However, these works are limited to the case where the two channels have
equal amount of loss (i.e. are symmetric). In a practical network setting, it is very likely that the
channels are asymmetric due to e.g. geographical locations. In this paper we extend the ”simple
TF-QKD” protocol to the scenario with asymmetric channels. We show that by simply adjusting
the two signal states of the two users (and not the decoy states) they can effectively compensate for
channel asymmetry and consistently obtain an order of magnitude higher key rate than previous
symmetric protocol. It also can provide 2-3 times higher key rate than the strategy of deliberately
adding fibre to the shorter channel until channels have equal loss (and is more convenient as users
only need to optimize their laser intensities and do not need to physically modify the channels).
We also perform simulation for a practical case with three decoy states and finite data size, and
show that our method works well and has a clear advantage over prior art methods with realistic
parameters.
I. BACKGROUND
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is proven to pro-
vide information-theoretic security to two communicat-
ing parties. Without efficient quantum repeaters, how-
ever, QKD is limited in the maximum distance over which
it can generate secure keys. The linear (also named
PLOB) bound is a theoretical upper bound for maxi-
mum key rate-distance relation for repeaterless QKD.
Interestingly, the Twin-Field (TF) QKD protocol pro-
posed in 2018 [1] uses a clever technique to surpass the
linear bound: it uses a setup where two parties, Alice
and Bob, communicate with an untrusted third party,
Charles. Instead of using two-photon interference like in
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [2], TF-
QKD makes use of single-photon interference to generate
keys, and on average only one photon passes through ei-
ther Alice’s or Bob’s channel - which allows to key rate
to scale with transmittance over only half the distance
between Alice and Bob. Not only does TF-QKD sur-
pass the repeaterless bound, it also provides security
against attacks on measurement devices [3] similar to
MDI-QKD. Because of these advantages, TF-QKD has
attracted much attention worldwide since its proposal.
Since a rigorous security proof is not provided in the orig-
inal proposal, several papers have improved the protocol
and provided security proof [4–8]. Also, recently there
have been multiple reports of TF-QKD demonstrated ex-
perimentally [9–12].
However, all the above security proofs and experi-
mental demonstrations only consider the symmetric case
where Alice’s and Bob’s channels have the same amount
of loss. In reality, though, in a network setting, due to
e.g. geographical locations, or Alice and Bob being sit-
uated on moving free-space platforms (such as ships or
satellites), it is very likely that Alice’s and Bob’s channels
are not symmetric. In the future, if a quantum network
is build around the protocol - e.g. a star-shaped network
where numerous users (senders) are connected to one cen-
tral node with measurement devices, asymmetry will be
an even more severe problem since it is difficult to main-
tain the same channel loss for all users (and users might
join/leave a network at arbitrary locations). If channels
are asymmetric, for prior art protocols, users would ei-
ther have to suffer from much higher quantum-bit-error-
rate (QBER) and hence lower key rate, or would have to
deliberately add fibre to the shorter channel to compen-
sate for channel asymmetry, which is inconvenient (since
it requires physically modifying the channels) and also
provides sub-optimal key rate.
Similar limitation to symmetric channels have been ob-
served in MDI-QKD. In Ref. [13], we have proposed a
method to overcome this limitation, by allowing Alice
and Bob to adjust their intensities (and use different op-
timization strategies for two decoupled bases) to compen-
sate for channel loss, without having to physically adjust
the channels. The method has also been successfully ex-
perimentally verified for asymmetric MDI-QKD in Ref.
[14].
In this work, we will apply our method to TF-QKD and
show that it is possible to obtain good key rate through
asymmetric channels by adjusting Alice’s and Bob’s in-
tensities - in fact, we will show that, Alice and Bob only
need to adjust their signal intensities to obtain optimal
performance. We show that the security of the protocol is
not affected, and that an order of magnitude higher (than
symmetric protocol) or 2-3 times higher (than adding fi-
bre) key rate can be achieved with the new method. Fur-
thermore, we show with numerical simulation results that
our method works well for both finite-decoy and finite-
data case with practical parameters, making it a conve-
nient and powerful method to improve the performance
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2of TF-QKD through asymmetric channels in reality.
The idea of asymmetric TF-QKD protocol has also
been discussed in a recent paper [15]. Our work is dif-
ferent from Ref. [15] in several aspects. First, Ref. [15]
starts with a different protocol—“sending or not sending
protocol”. Second, Ref. [15] is mostly numerical. In con-
trast, we start with the “simple TF-QKD” protocol in
[7] and consider its asymmetric version. We include both
analytical and numerical reasoning. We also provide a
detailed discussion about the physics behind the security
of our asymmetric protocol.
II. PROTOCOL
Here we consider a similar Twin-Field (TF) QKD setup
as in Ref. [7] “Protocol 3”. Alice and Bob choose two
bases X and Z randomly. When X basis is chosen, Alice
(Bob) sends states |α〉a (|α〉b) for bit bA = 0 (bB = 0)
or states |−α〉a (|−α〉b) for bit bA = 1 (bB = 1). When
Z basis is chosen, Alice and Bob send phase-randomized
coherent states ρa,βA (ρb,βB ), where the decoy state in-
tensities are {βA, βB}. Note that here Alice and Bob
have a common phase reference for X basis signals. Af-
ter the signals are sent to Charles, the detector events
are denoted as kc, kd (0 denotes no click, and 1 denotes
a click).
FIG. 1. An example setup for a Twin-Field QKD system.
Alice and Bob send signals in X and Z bases randomly. In
X basis, Alice and Bob send coherent states with amplitudes
αA, αB (with intensities sA = α
2
A, sB = α
2
B - in the asym-
metric case, we allow sA to be different from sB), phase-
modulated by {0, pi} depending on the encoded bit. In Z
basis, Alice and Bob send signals in phase-randomized co-
herent states, with intensities chosen from {µA, νA, ωA} and
{µA, νA, ωA}, respectively. Charles performs a swap test on
the incoming signals and reports the click events in his two
detectors Dc, Dd (denoted by kc, kd). By choosing different
intensities between Alice and Bob (and using the decoupled X
and Z bases), the protocol can have high key rate even if Alice
and Bob’s channels have different transmittances, ηA, ηB .
The papers [1, 7] consider only the case where the
channels between Alice (Bob) and Charles have equal
transmittances. In reality, it is possible that the channels
might have different levels of loss, due to e.g. geograph-
ical locations or moving platforms. Here we are inter-
ested in three questions for TF-QKD with asymmetric
channels:
1. Does channel asymmetry affect security?
2. How does channel asymmetry affect the quantum bit
error rate (QBER) and hence key rate?1
3. Can we improve the performance of the protocol
under channel asymmetry?
We will use our method from Ref. [13] and apply it
to Protocol 3 in Ref. [7], to make an asymmetric TF-
QKD protocol that works well even when channels are
highly asymmetric. Similar to MDI-QKD, the protocol
in [7] has decoupled X and Z bases. Here we allow Alice
and Bob to have different intensities in the X and the
Z bases respectively, such that in X basis Alice (Bob)
now send states |αA〉a (|αB〉b) for bit bA = 0 (bB = 0)
or states |−αA〉a (|−αB〉b) for bit bA = 1 (bB = 1). We
can denote the signal intensities as sA = α
2
A, sB = α
2
B .
In the Z basis, the amplitudes for the phase-randomized
coherent states, {βA, βB}, can be different for Alice and
Bob too (we can denote the intensities as {β2A, β2B}, and
for the three-decoy case, the sets of intensities can be
specifically written as {µA, νA, ωA} and {µA, νA, ωA}).
An example setup can be found in Fig. 1.
We will answer the above three questions by showing
in the following text three main pieces of results:
(1) Neither asymmetric channels nor asymmetric in-
tensities between Alice and Bob affect security.
(2) The X basis (signal state) QBER will increase with
channel asymmetry, and greatly reduce the key rate of
TF-QKD if no compensation is performed - on the other
hand, the Z basis gain (as well as the upper bound to the
yield and phase-error rate derived from the observable
data in the Z basis) is little affected by channel asymme-
try.
(3) We can use different intensities between Alice and
Bob to compensate for channel asymmetry and get good
key rate - in fact, using only different signal states be-
tween Alice and Bob (and keeping all decoy states and
probabilities identical for Alice and Bob) can already ef-
fectively compensate for channel asymmetry and allow
good key rate for asymmetric TF-QKD.
III. SECURITY
In this section we will show that neither asymmetric
channels nor asymmetric intensities between Alice and
Bob affect security. Following the discussion in [7], the
key is generated from events in the X basis, and the se-
cure key rate is bounded using the bit-error rate and the
phase-error rate. The X basis bit-error rate is directly
1 In the Supplementary Materials of Ref. [14], we and our collab-
orators presented a preliminary study on this point, and showed
that asymmetry decreases single-photon interference visibility -
which will in turn increase observable QBER for TF-QKD.
3obtained as an observable, hence the key part of the se-
curity proof lies in the estimation of X basis phase-error
rate (equivalent to the Z basis bit-error rate) based on
the Z basis observables - which, since Z basis signals are
phase-randomized, is not directly obtainable.
In the security proof in Ref. [7], the phase-error rate
is obtained by upper-bounding the phase-error rate us-
ing the observed yields of given photon numbers {m,n}
(which can be estimated using decoy-state analysis, based
on observed count rates, i.e. the gains, in the Z basis).
The key message we’d like to point out is that, this
entire estimation process of the phase error rate does not
rely on the fact that Alice and Bob use the same ampli-
tude α for their signal states, or that the channels have
the same transmittance. Therefore, here we will follow
the proof in Ref. [7] step-by-step, but with asymmetric
intensities and channel transmittances, to show that the
security proof can be easily - in fact trivially - extended
to the asymmetric case.
We can start by imagining a virtual scenario where
Alice (Bob) prepares entangled states between a local
qubit A (B) and a signal a (b) to be sent to Charles.
After Charles performs a measurement on the signals,
the X basis phase-error rate (or Z basis bit-error rate)
can be obtained by Alice (Bob) measuring their local
qubits in the Z basis. The initial states can be written
as:
|ψAX〉Aa =
1√
2
(|+〉A |αA〉a + |−〉A |−αA〉a)
|ψBX〉Bb =
1√
2
(|+〉B |αB〉b + |−〉B |−αB〉b)
(1)
here |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) are the X basis states. Here in
the asymmetric case, we allow sA = α
2
A to be different
from sB = α
2
B . Now, the process of signals a and b going
through their respective channels and Charles making a
measurement can be represented by a Kraus operator
Mˆabkckd , where kc, kd are Charles’ detector events. Note
that, this operator Mˆabkckd includes all information of the
channels and detectors and is a general representation of
their joint effects, and, importantly, it does not require
that the channels are symmetric at all. After signals pass
through the channels and Charles makes a measurement,
the state becomes:
|χkckd〉Aa′Bb′ =
Mˆabkckd |ψAX〉Aa |ψBX〉Bb√
pXX(kc, kd)
(2)
here pXX(kc, kd) is the X basis Gain for detection events
kc, kd (which can be 0, 1 or 1, 0 for a detection event to be
considered successful). By measuring their local qubits
in the Z basis, Alice and Bob can obtain the Z basis bit-
error rate eZZ,kckd (i.e. the X basis phase-error rate):
eZZ,kckd =
∑
j=0,1
||AB 〈jj| |χkckd〉Aa′Bb′ ||2 (3)
Now, the key observation in the proof of [7] is that,
Alice and Bob making a measurement on the local qubits
A and B after sending signals a and b and Charles making
a measurement should be equivalent to the time-reversed
scenario where Alice and Bob first make local Z basis
measurements on states |ψAX〉Aa , |ψBX〉Bb, and then send
the signal systems a and b to Charles. After Alice and
Bob make the local measurements, the states become
A 〈0| |ψX〉Aa = |CA0 〉a
A 〈1| |ψX〉Aa = |CA1 〉a
B 〈0| |ψX〉Bb = |CB0 〉b
B 〈1| |ψX〉Bb = |CB1 〉b
(4)
which are cat states:
|CA0 〉a = e−
α2A
2
∞∑
n=0
α2nA√
2n
|2n〉a =
∞∑
n=0
cA,(0)n |n〉a
|CA1 〉a = e−
α2A
2
∞∑
n=0
α2n+1A√
2n+ 1
|2n+ 1〉a =
∞∑
n=0
cA,(1)n |n〉a
|CB0 〉b = e−
α2B
2
∞∑
n=0
α2nB√
2n
|2n〉b =
∞∑
n=0
cB,(0)n |n〉b
|CB1 〉b = e−
α2B
2
∞∑
n=0
α2n+1B√
2n+ 1
|2n+ 1〉b =
∞∑
n=0
cB,(1)n |n〉b
(5)
here the even (odd) cat states only contain nonzero
amplitudes for even (odd) photon numbers. Nonethe-
less we can still write the amplitudes as c
A,(0)
n , c
B,(0)
n
(c
A,(1)
n , c
B,(1)
n ) for all photon number states, where the
coefficients are zero for odd (even) photon number states
in an even (odd) cat state.
Note that here in the asymmetric case, Alice and Bob’s
cat states are not the same, because they use different sig-
nal intensities (hence different amplitudes αA, αB), but
as we will show below, this does not affect the estimation
of the upper bound for the phase error rate.
For Alice and Bob’s local Z basis measurement results
i, j = 0, 1 and for detection events kc, kd:
pXX(kc, kd)||AB〈ij| |χkckd〉Aa′B′b ||2
= ||Mˆabkckd A〈i| |ψAX〉Aa B〈j| |ψBX〉Bb ||2
= ||Mˆabkckd |CAi 〉a |CBj 〉b ||2
(6)
which means that, the probabilities for local Z basis mea-
surement results i, j = 0, 1 (which determine the phase-
error rate) can be acquired by observing the gain if Alice
4and Bob sent cat states. However, Alice and Bob are
not really sending cat states - when Z basis is chosen,
they are sending phase-randomized coherent states. Us-
ing decoy-state analysis, what Alice and Bob acquire are
the yields for phase-randomized photon number states,
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB). The yields for photon number states
are linked to Eq. (6) using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
ity that upper-bounds the gains for cat states (and sub-
sequently the phase-error rate):
||Mˆabkckd |CAi 〉a |CBj 〉b ||2
= a〈CAi | b〈CBj |Mˆ
ab†
kckd
Mˆabkckd |CAi 〉a |CBj 〉b
=
∞∑
mA,mB ,nA,nB=0
cA,(i)mA c
B,(j)
mB c
A,(i)
nA c
B,(j)
nB
× a〈mA| b〈mB |Mˆab†kckdMˆabkckd |nA〉a |nB〉b
≤
∞∑
mA,mB ,nA,nB=0
cA,(i)mA c
B,(j)
mB c
A,(i)
nA c
B,(j)
nB
× ||Mˆabkckd |mA〉a |mB〉b || × ||Mˆabkckd |nA〉a |nB〉b ||
=
[ ∞∑
nA,nB=0
cA,(i)nA c
B,(j)
nB
√
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB)
]2
(7)
This means that, the phase-error rate can be upper-
bounded by the yields for photon number states
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB):
pXX(kc, kd)eZZ(kc, kd)
=pXX(kc, kd)
∑
i=0,1
||AB〈ii| |χkckd〉Aa′B′b ||2
≤
∑
i=0,1
[ ∞∑
nA,nB=0
cA,(i)nA c
B,(i)
nB
√
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB)
]2 (8)
this phase error rate, combined with the bit error rate in
the X basis, can be used to perform privacy amplification
on the error-corrected raw keys and obtain the secure key.
The key point is that, the above proof that upper
bounds the phase error rate does not require the fact
that αA = αB at all. The different signal intensities
will cause Alice and Bob to have different cat states, but
these states are independently used to obtain inner prod-
uct with A〈i| and B〈j| respectively. With the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, the joint cat states are reduced to a
mixture of photon number states, and there are no cross-
terms between the two cat states.
This means that, using asymmetric intensities between
Alice and Bob will not affect the estimation of phase error
rate. Moreover, as we described in Eq. (2), Mˆabkckd is a
general representation of the channels and detection, and
does not require that ηA = ηB either, i.e. asymmetric
channels do not affect the security proof either.
Additionally, the decoy intensities {β2A, β2B} might be
different for Alice and Bob too, but these states are
only used to estimate the yields of photon number states
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) using decoy-state analysis, which is
exactly the same process as in MDI-QKD. As long as
Eve cannot distinguish pulses from different intensity
settings, this decoy-state analysis is secure, even in the
asymmetric setting - since the sending of a given photon
number n given the Poisson distribution P (n|µ) = e−µ µnn!
is a Markov process, i.e. memoryless process, Eve has no
way of telling which intensity setting the photon number
state came from, therefore using asymmetric intensities
does not affect the estimation of yields for photon num-
ber states pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB).
Therefore, overall, we conclude that neither asymmet-
ric channel losses, nor asymmetric intensities Alice and
Bob use (for signal states or decoy states), will affect the
security of the protocol. Asymmetry will only affect the
performance of the protocol (which will be the subject of
discussion in the next section) - asymmetric channels will
result in higher QBER and subsequently lower key rate,
and asymmetric intensities can compensate for channel
asymmetry and enable high key rate for the protocol even
when channels are highly asymmetric.
IV. PERFORMANCE
In this section we will discuss how channel asymmetry,
and asymmetric intensities, can affect the performance of
TF-QKD.
A. Channel Model
We will first discuss the channel model in the asym-
metric case. Again, we extend the expressions in the Ap-
pendix of Ref. [7], and consider asymmetric intensities
and channel transmittances.
To obtain the secure key rate, three sets of observ-
ables are needed: the X basis gain pXX(kc, kd), the X
basis bit-error rate eXX(kc, kd), and the Z basis gain
pZZ(kc, kd|βA, βB) (for all combinations of {βA, βB}).
Now, let us suppose Alice and Bob send signals with
intensities sA, sB , and channels between Alice/Bob and
Charles have transmittances ηA, ηB . For simplicity we
can write:
γA = sAηA
γB = sBηB
(9)
for signal states, and
γ′A = µ
i
AηA
γ′B = µ
j
BηB
(10)
5for decoy states, where µiA and µ
j
B are selected from the
set of decoy intensities.
The other imperfections in the channel include the
dark count rate pd, the polarization misalignment be-
tween Alice and Bob θ, and the phase mismatch φ be-
tween Alice and Bob. If we first do not consider dark
counts and phase mismatch, the intensities arriving at
the detectors C and D at Charles can be written as (sim-
ilar to the discussions in Ref. [16]):
Dc =
1
2
(γA + γB − 2√γAγBcosθ)
Dd =
1
2
(γA + γB + 2
√
γAγBcosθ)
(11)
the probability that one detector clicks and the other
doesn’t (e.g. C clicks and D doesn’t) can be written as
(1− e−Dc)e−Dd
=e−Dd − e−(Dc+Dd)
=e−
1
2 [γA+γB+2
√
γAγBcosθ] − e−(γA+γB)
(12)
Including the phase mismatch and dark counts, we can
write the X basis gain and QBER in a similar form as
Ref. [7]:
pXX(kd, kd)
=
1
2
(1− pd)
(
e−
√
γAγBcosφcosθ + e
√
γAγBcosφcosθ
)
×e− 12 (γA+γB) − (1− pd)2e−(γA+γB)
(13)
eXX(kd, kd)
=
e−
√
γAγBcosφcosθ − (1− pd)e− 12 (γA+γB)
e−
√
γAγBcosφcosθ + e
√
γAγBcosφcosθ − 2(1− pd)e− 12 (γA+γB)
(14)
and the Z basis gain is the integral over all possible (ran-
dom) relative phases:
pZZ(kd, kd|βA, βB)
=(1− pd)
[
e−
1
2 (γ
′
A+γ
′
B)I0(
√
γ′Aγ
′
Bcosθ)− e−(γ
′
A+γ
′
B)
]
+pd(1− pd)e−(γ′A+γ′B)
(15)
The Z basis gain can be used in decoy-state analysis to
obtain m,n photon yields pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB). Here for
simplicity we first consider the infinite-decoy case, where
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) can be assumed to be perfectly known
(similar to Eq. (35) in Ref. [7] but with asymmetric
channel transmittances):
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB)
=
nA∑
k=0
(
nA
k
) nB∑
l=0
(
nB
l
)
ηkAη
l
B(1− ηA)nA−k(1− ηB)nB−l
2k+lk!l!
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
) l∑
p=0
(
l
p
) min(k,m+p)∑
q=max(0,m+p−l)
(
k
q
)(
l
m+ p− q
)
(m+ p)!(k + l −m− p)!cosm+q(θA)cosm+p−q(θB)
sin2k−m−q(θA)sin2l−m−2p+q(θB)
− (1− ηA)nA(1− ηB)nB
(16)
In the case with finite decoys (e.g. 3 decoy states for
each of Alice and Bob), we can use linear programming
to upper-bound the yields, which is described in more
detail in Appendix A.
Afterwards, the phase-error rate can be upper-
bounded using these yields:
pXX(kc, kd)eZZ(kc, kd)
≤
∑
i=0,1
[ ∞∑
nA,nB=0
cA,(i)nA c
B,(i)
nB
√
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB)
]2
(17)
With the the X basis gain pXX(kc, kd), the X ba-
sis bit-error rate eXX(kc, kd), and the phase-error rate
eZZ(kc, kd), we can obtain the final secure key rate:
Rkckd = pXX(kc, kd)
× [1− h2(eXX(kc, kd))− h2(eZZ(kc, kd))] (18)
where h2(x) = −xlog2(x)−(1−x)log2(1−x) is the binary
entropy function.
B. Effect of Channel and Intensity Asymmetry on
Gain and QBER
In the estimation of key rate, only three sets of observ-
ables are used: the X basis gain pXX(kc, kd), the X basis
bit-error rate eXX(kc, kd), and the set of Z basis gain for
each combination of decoy intensities pZZ(kc, kd|βA, βB).
Here we note that, the X basis gain and Z basis gain do
not depend on channel asymmetry, and only the X basis
QBER is affected by asymmetry.
For simplicity, here let us consider the second-order
approximation for the Bessel function and exponential
function, and for now ignore the phase mismatch and
dark count rate:
I0(x) = 1 +
1
4
x2 +O(x4)
ex = 1 + x+
1
2
x2 +O(x3)
(19)
6We can then rewrite the X basis gain as:
pXX(kd, kd)
=
1
2
(
e−
√
γAγBcosθ + e
√
γAγBcosφcosθ
)
× e− 12 (γA+γB)
− e−(γA+γB)
≈1
2
(γA + γB)− 1
8
[
3γ2A + 3γ
2
B + (2 + 4ed)γAγB
]
(20)
and the Z basis gain as:
pZZ(kd, kd|βA, βB)
=e−
1
2 (γ
′
A+γ
′
B)I0(
√
γ′Aγ
′
Bcosθ)− e−(γ
′
A+γ
′
B)
≈1
2
(γ′A + γ
′
B)−
1
8
[
3γ
′2
A + 3γ
′2
B + (4 + 2ed)γ
′
Aγ
′
B
] (21)
where the terms higher than second order are omitted,
and θ is the total polarization misalignment angle be-
tween Alice and Bob satisfying θ = 2sin−1(
√
ed)) (sup-
pose Alice-Charles and Bob-Charles each has misalign-
ment error ed, but with misalignment angles in differ-
ent directions). We can see that, the gain in both X
and Z basis is dominated by the term 12 (γA + γB) =
1
2 (sAηA + sBηB) or
1
2 (γ
′
A + γ
′
B) =
1
2 (µ
i
AηA + µ
j
BηB), i.e.
taking first-order approximation:
pXX(kd, kd) ≈ 1
2
(γA + γB)
pZZ(kd, kd|βA, βB) ≈ 1
2
(γ′A + γ
′
B)
(22)
which means that the gain scales with the average of
arriving intensities through Alice’s and Bob’s channels
- this is different from MDI-QKD, where the gain only
contains the second-order terms γ2A, γ
2
B , γAγB . We can
also see that the gain does not depend on the asymmetry
of arriving intensities, e.g. γA/γB .
On the other hand, the QBER in X basis depends on
the balance of arriving intensities:
eXX(kd, kd)
=
e−
√
γAγBcosφcosθ − (1− pd)e− 12 (γA+γB)
e−
√
γAγBcosφcosθ + e
√
γAγBcosφcosθ − 2(1− pd)e− 12 (γA+γB)
≈
1
2 (γA + γB)−
√
γAγBcosθ +
1
2γAγBcos
2θ − 18 (γA + γB)2
(γA + γB) + γAγBcos2θ − 14 (γA + γB)2
(23)
which, in the first-order approximation2, can be simpli-
fied as:
2 The first order approximation for eXX(kd, kd) assumes that
γA, γB are much smaller than 1 - which is reasonable, since to get
eXX(kd, kd) ≈
1
2 (γA + γB)−
√
γAγBcosθ
γA + γB
=
1
2 (
γA
γB
+ 1)−
√
γA
γB
cosθ
γA
γB
+ 1
(24)
We can see that here the X basis QBER does de-
pend on asymmetry - more precisely, it depends on how
much the arriving intensities at Charles, γA = ηAsA and
γB = ηBsB are balanced. This is understandable physi-
cally, since the X basis key generation depends on single-
photon interference and relies on the indistinguishability
of incoming signals. This means that, in the case that
channels are not symmetric, compensating for the chan-
nel asymmetry with different signal intensities for Alice
and Bob and aiming for ηAsA = ηBsB can help minimize
the X basis QBER.
On the other hand, in the Z basis, the bit-error
rate (i.e. the X basis phase-error rate) cannot be
directly measured, but is instead upper-bounded us-
ing the observable gain data from the decoy states.
As we mentioned above, the Z basis gain (in the
first-order approximation) scales with 12 (γ
′
A + γ
′
B) =
1
2 (µ
i
AηA + µ
j
BηB) and does not depend on the symme-
try between incoming intensities. Moreover, the yields
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) are estimated using linear program-
ming. For instance, for three decoys where Alice and
Bob respectively use {µA, νA, ωA}, {µB , νB , ωB} as their
decoy states, there are nine sets of observable gains,
{Qµµ, Qµν , Qµω, Qνµ, Qνν , Qνω, Qωµ, Qων , Qωω}, each of
which constitutes a constraint for the linear program that
helps bound the yields pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB). Such a struc-
ture makes the linear program relatively robust against
asymmetry in the decoy states, and the linear program
can fairly accurately upper-bound the yields as long as
the intensities are of reasonable values (i.e. µA 6= νA,
µB 6= νB , and none of the intensities are too large e.g.
> 1).
The phase error rate, as shown in Eq. (17), is based on
a linear combination of the square root of the yields. It is
therefore also very little affected by asymmetry, and al-
most always reaches a good value (at least in the infinite-
data case) so long as the intensities are within reasonable
range, regardless of the asymmetries in channel transmit-
tances or decoy intensities.
We plot the QBER in the X and the Z bases versus
asymmetry in arriving intensities (e.g. sAηA/sBηB or
µAηA/µBηB) in Fig. 2. As can be seen, the X basis
QBER depends heavily on asymmetry and is minimal
a good phase-error rate estimation, usually sA, sB are smaller or
equal to 0.1, and for positions of interest where TF-QKD beats
PLOB bound, the loss in each channel is usually larger than
10dB, which means that ηA and ηB are much smaller than 1 too
- for instance 10dB channel loss corresponds to 0.1 transmittance.
7FIG. 2. QBER versus asymmetry in arriving intensities at Charles, in the X and Z bases. Here we consider kc, kd = 0, 1,
while the other case of kc, kd = 1, 0 has exactly the same values. Both plots use parameters ηA = ηB = 1 (as well as detector
efficiency 100%) and assume misalignment of 2% from Alice and Bob each, and no dark counts or phase mismatch. (a) We
plot the X basis QBER (acquired from full expression in Eq. (14)) as well as its first-order approximation (acquired from Eq.
(24)). Here we vary sA while keeping sB = 0.1 to test different levels of asymmetry. As can be seen, the X basis QBER heavily
depends on the symmetry between arriving intensities sAηA and sBηB . Physically, this is because key generation depends on
single-photon interference and therefore requires indistinguishability of incoming signals. When ηB/ηA 6= 1, X basis QBER
will increase drastically if intensities are symmetric, while one can adjust sA/sB such that sA/sB = ηB/ηA to obtain minimal
X basis QBER. a (b) We plot the Z basis bit-error rate (i.e. X basis phase-error rate) obtained from linear programming using
data from 3 decoy states. Here we set νA = νB = 0.01, ωA = ωB = 0, and signal states sA = sB = 0.1. We fix µB = 0.1 and
vary sA to test asymmetry. As can be seen, the upper-bounded phase error rate depends very little on the asymmetry between
µAηA and µBηB , and the linear program can effectively bound the error rate - in fact rather close to the theoretical value
obtained with infinite-decoys - as long as µA, µB are of reasonable values
b. The physical intuition is clear too: the yields are
estimated by linear programming, which usually has redundant information (in the 9 cross terms Qµiµj where Alice and Bob
each uses one of their three decoys) and is insensitive to asymmetry, and the phase-error rate (Eq. (17)) is a linear combination
of the yields, which makes it insensitive to asymmetry just like the yields.
a Note that first-order deviation no longer works for sA  1 - in this case, the majority of the detection events are double counts and
are discarded, despite that the actual exx is lower among the single detections (approaching zero as sA increases) - but generally the
phase error rate estimation requires low signal intensities, and such high sA will not return positive key rate anyway, so this region will
not be of interest to us.
b with two exceptions: when µA = νA, or µA  1, the constraints from observable data containing µA cannot provide any useful
information, and the linear program has to use the data from one less decoy state, which is why the ezz is higher for these two extreme
cases.
when sAηA/sBηB = 1, while the upper-bounded Z ba-
sis QBER (i.e. phase-error rate) is hardly affected by
asymmetry.
Therefore, a viable strategy for TF-QKD in asymmet-
ric channels is to compensate for the channel asymme-
try with signal intensities {sA, sB} only, while the decoy
intensities {µA, νA, ωA}, {µB , νB , ωB} can be still kept
symmetric. However, note that the signal intensities not
only determines (1) X basis QBER, it also affects (2) X
basis gain (which determines the raw key generation rate,
and favors large sA, sB), as well as (3) upper-bound of
phase error rate (since the cat states are determined by
signal intensities, and the estimation favors small sA, sB
- typically < 0.1 - for a tighter upper bound on phase
error rate). Criteria (1-3) cannot be simultaneously sat-
isfied, therefore an optimization for {sA, sB} is required
for highest key rate.
Interestingly, we can compare this with the case of
MDI-QKD. As described in Ref. [13], the 4-intensity
protocol (and 7-intensity protocol in the extended asym-
metric case) has decoupled X and Z bases, where Z basis
is used for key generation and X basis uses decoy states
to estimation phase-error rate. In MDI-QKD, the X ba-
sis data depends on two-photon interference and requires
balanced arriving intensities (or else the X basis QBER
will increase dramatically), while the Z basis does not re-
quire indistinguishability of the signals, and is therefore
insensitive to channel asymmetry. In MDI-QKD, all the
X basis decoy states should satisfy e.g. µAηA = µBηB ,
while the signal states sA, sB can be chosen to simply op-
timize key generation rate. (Due to misalignment, there
is a slight dependence of Z basis QBER to asymmetry
too, hence optimal sA, sB are still not equal, but this is
a much weaker dependence on symmetry than in the X
basis, and optimal sA/sB is much closer to 1 than ηB/ηA
in MDI-QKD.)
While our approach works both for MDI-QKD and TF-
QKD, a key difference is that states that compensate
for channel asymmetry are the signal states in TF-QKD
(while this responsibility lies on decoy states in MDI-
QKD), which are also involved in key generation and
phase error estimation. This means that in TF-QKD,
it is more difficult to simultaneously keep a low X ba-
sis QBER and a good key generation rate & low phase
8error rate. Perhaps due to this reason, the advantage
of asymmetric protocols is somewhat less pronounced in
TF-QKD - nonetheless, it still provides about an order
of magnitude higher key rate than completely symmetric
protocols and still 2-3 times higher key rate than adding
fibre - which means that it still is the strategy that pro-
vides highest key rate when channels are asymmetric.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
FIG. 3. Key rate versus loss between Alice and Bob, for proto-
col with symmetric intensities (sA = sB), symmetric intensi-
ties with fibre added until channels are equal, and asymmetric
intensities (sA, sB fully optimized). The channel mismatch is
fixed at ηA/ηB = 0.1 (above) and ηA/ηB = 0.01 (below), i.e.
Alice-Charles always has 10dB (20dB) higher loss than Bob-
Charles. The dark count rate is set to 10−8, and misalignment
is 2% for Alice and Bob each. As can be seen, allowing the
use of asymmetric intensities greatly improves key rate when
channels are asymmetric, and compared with a symmetric
protocol, it can consistently provide approximately one order
of magnitude higher key rate when there is a 10dB channel
mismatch, and two orders of magnitude when there is a 20dB
mismatch, for most distances. Interestingly, adding fibre can
improve the key rate considerably too - but it still has lower
key rate than the asymmetric protocol (the latter has about
2-3 times higher key rate), and has the additional inconve-
nience of having to modify the physical channel.
In this section we use the technique described above
- to compensate for channel asymmetry simply with dif-
ferent sA, sB for Alice and Bob. We first compare our
method with prior art techniques and study the numer-
FIG. 4. Ratio of optimal intensities log10(sA/sB) over loss
between Alice and Bob. Here we test two cases where
ηA/ηB = 0.1 and ηA/ηB = 0.01. As can be seen, sA/sB is
rather close to ηB/ηA (here respectively 10
1 and 102). How-
ever, due to signal states being involved in key generation and
phase-error rate estimation too, it slightly deviates from the
value that minimizes X basis QBER (and instead takes the
value that maximizes key rate).
FIG. 5. Key rate versus loss between Alice and Bob, for pro-
tocol with symmetric intensities and probabilities, with sym-
metric intensities and fibre added until channels are equal,
with only asymmetric signal intensities (while all other pa-
rameters are symmetric between Alice and Bob), and with
fully optimized parameters (all intensities and probabilities
are freely optimized). Here we consider 10−8 dark count rate
and N = 1012 total pulses sent, and channel asymmetry of
x = ηA/ηB = 0.1. As we can see, similar to the asymp-
totic case, using asymmetric intensities can greatly improve
the key rate. Perhaps more interestingly, we can see that al-
lowing asymmetry in signal intensities alone is sufficient in
obtaining a good key rate through asymmetric channels (its
key rate almost overlaps with the fully optimized case.)
ically optimized intensities for the asymptotic (infinite-
decoy, infinite-data) case. Then, we also show that our
method works with finite decoys and also finite data size.
We plot the simulation results for asymptotic TF-QKD
in Fig. 3. As can be seen, for the two cases ηA/ηB = 0.1
and ηA/ηB = 0.01, our method consistently have much
higher key rate than TF-QKD with symmetric intensi-
ties. Interestingly, we show that adding fibre can help
users obtain higher key rate, but it comes with the addi-
9tional inconvenience of having to physically modify the
channel, and also it still has lower key rate than our
method of simply adjusting signal intensities.
We also plot the ratio of optimal signal intensities in
Fig. 4. As we have predicted, the optimal signal inten-
sities are rather close to the relation of sAηA = sBηB ,
in order to maintain a lower X basis QBER. However,
as we discussed, since signal states are also involved in
key generation and phase error rate estimation (based on
the imaginary cat states), they prevent the signal states
from taking the values that minimize QBER (but rather,
makes it choose the value that maximizes the overall key
rate).
Additionally, we also plot our results for the practical
case with finite number of decoys (here we use three de-
coys each for Alice and Bob: {µA, νA, ωA}, {µB , νB , ωB})
and finite data size. The upper-bounding of photon num-
ber yields using linear programming, as well as the finite-
key analysis, are both described in more detail in Ap-
pendix A. We can see that similar result holds - our
method has an advantage over either using symmetric
intensities directly or adding fibre. More interestingly,
we include both the case where we only allow sA, sB to
be asymmetric, versus the case where all intensities and
probabilities can be optimized, and as shown in the plot,
we see that using asymmetric signal intensities alone is
sufficient to compensate for channel asymmetry.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a simple method to obtain
good performance for TF-QKD even if channels are
asymmetric. We present a theoretical understanding
of why signal states (and not decoy states) should be
adjusted to compensate for asymmetry, and we also
show that the method is still compatible with existing
security proofs. With our method, there is no need to
add additional fibre, and Alice and Bob can implement
the method in software-only. This provides great conve-
nience for TF-QKD in practice - where realistic channels
might likely be asymmetric - and can also be used in
quantum networks (where adding fibre for each pair of
users is impractical) where a central service-provider can
easily optimize the intensities for each pair of users.
Note added: We note that, during the preparation of
the current manuscript, it came into our knowledge that
another work on asymmetric TF-QKD is under prepa-
ration [17], which is independently completed from this
work.
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Appendix A: Numerically Estimating
Photon-Number Yields with Linear Programs
In this section we briefly describe the linear program-
ming approach we used to estimate the upper bounds
for the photon-number yields pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) - which
for simplicity here we will denote as Ynm - which is the
probability to obtain a set of detection events kc, kd given
that Alice and Bob respectively sent nA, nB (or, n,m)
photons. Such an approach has been widely discussed in
literature as in Refs.[18–20], and is also described in the
simple TF-QKD proof paper [7]. We also used a similar
linear programming approach for some of the results in
Ref. [13] Appendix E, but it was not described in detail
in that paper.
For simplicity, in this section we denote the observ-
able gain in Z basis pZZ(kc, kd|βA, βB) as Qµi,µj where
µi = β
2
A and µj = β
2
B , and kc, kd are omitted (since
the same expressions hold true for kc, kd = (0, 1) or
kc, kd = (1, 0), and we can substitute the observable data
for each kc, kd respectively to obtain the corresponding
pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB)). Also, as mentioned above, we de-
note the yields pZZ(kc, kd|nA, nB) as Ynm.
1. Linear Program Model
Following Ref.[2], the yields Ynm where Alice sends
n photons and Bob sends m photons, satisfy the con-
straints:
∑
n
∑
m
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm = Q
Z
µiµj (A1)
where the photon number distributions are Poissonian:
Pµin = e
µi
µni
n!
Pµjm = e
µj
µmj
m!
(A2)
Here, the right-hand-side constants QZµiµj are the ”ob-
servables”, i.e. the gain and error-gain respectively for
the intensity combination µi, µj (which can be any inten-
sity among the set of decoy intensities). For the case of 3-
decoys each for Alice and Bob, Eq. (A1) corresponds to 9
sets of constraints. Using Eq. (A1) as linear constraints,
and {Ynm} as variables, we can apply linear program-
ming, to maximize or minimize any linear combination
of any of the variables (called an objective function) - for
instance, here we can run the linear program multiple
times, each time acquiring the upper bound for a given
Ynm where (n,m) can be (0, 0), (2, 0), (0, 2), (1, 1), (2, 2).
Note that, since there are infinitely many photon num-
ber states, to solve the linear program on an actual com-
puter, we have to perform a cut-off and discard higher-
order terms with large photon number. In practice we
choose Scut = 10, such that a term is only discarded
when both n ≥ 10 and m ≥ 10. For the discarded terms,
we can either set them to zero (for lower bounds) or 1
(for upper bounds).
∑
n
∑
m
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm ≥
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm∑
n
∑
m
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm ≤
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm
+
(
1−
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m
) (A3)
Therefore, in practice, the linear constraints can be
written as:
QZµiµj −
(
1−
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m
)
≤
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm
≤ QZµiµj
(A4)
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with the additional constraint on variables:
0 ≤ Ynm ≤ 1 (A5)
The linear program is run multiple times, each
time maximizing a given Ymn, where (n,m) can be
(0, 0), (2, 0), (0, 2), (1, 1), (2, 2).
2. Finite-Size Effects
In this subsection we consider finite-size effects for the
privacy amplification process. Because of the statistical
fluctuations, the observables (gains) we obtain in the Z
basis might deviate from their respective expected val-
ues, which will lie within a certain “confidence interval”
around the observed values. Here we will perform a stan-
dard error analysis, similar to that in [13, 18, 21], which
is meant to be a straightforward estimation of the perfor-
mance of TF-QKD under asymmetry and with practical
data size, but not as a rigorous proof for composable se-
curity.
Consider a random variable, whose observed value is
n, we can bound its expected value 〈n〉 with the upper
and lower bounds
n = n− γ√n ≤ 〈n〉 ≤ n+ γ√n = n (A6)
with a confidence (success probability) of erf(γ/
√
2),
where γ is the number of standard deviations the con-
fidence interval lies above and below the observed value,
and erf is the error function. In the simulations we con-
sider a security failure probability of  = 10−7, which
means we should set γ ≈ 5.3.
In the Z basis, let us denote the observed counts for a
given intensity setting {µi, µj} as nZµi,µj , which satisfies
nZµi,µj = Q
Z
µi,µj × (NPµiPµj ) (A7)
where N is the total number of signals sent and Pµi , Pµj
are the probabilities for Alice and Bob to respectively
choose intensities µi and µj . By applying Eq. (A6), we
can acquire the upper and lower bounds to QZµi,µj :
QZµiµj = Q
Z
µiµj + γ
√
QZµiµj
NPµiPµj
QZµiµj = Q
Z
µiµj − γ
√
QZµiµj
NPµiPµj
(A8)
Then, we can substitute them into the upper and lower
bounds in the linear program when estimating Ynm:
QZµiµj −
(
1−
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m
)
≤
∑
n<10
∑
m<10
Pµin P
µj
m Ynm
≤ QZµiµj
(A9)
which loosens the bounds and will result in a slightly
higher upper bound for Ynm (which is understandable,
since we expect lower key rate with finite-size effect con-
sidered). Similar linear programs for finite-size decoy-
state have also been considered in Ref. [19].
Note that, although here we only consider a standard
error analysis, in principle our results in this paper is
applicable to e.g. composable security using Chernoff’s
bound [20]. The key point is, the dependence on channel
asymmetry, and the compensation for asymmetry using
intensities, are only relevant in the X basis (signal states).
The asymptotic case (with infinite decoys, where only sig-
nal states are relevant) therefore defines the fundamental
scaling of key rate versus asymmetric channels, and all
types of finite size analysis on the decoy states (e.g. us-
ing standard error analysis, using Chernoff’s bound [20],
adding a joint bound analysis to tighten the bounds[21],
or not using finite-size analysis at all) can be viewed of
as correction terms (imperfections) on the yields and the
key rate. Our method is only related to the signal states
and their intensities in the X basis, and is in principle
always applicable regardless of the type of decoy state
analysis (e.g. number of decoys) and the finite-size anal-
ysis used, as long as the Z basis is decoupled from the X
basis.
With finite-size effect considered, the optimizable pa-
rameters for TF-QKD now include
[sA, µA, νA, PsA , PµA , PνA ,
sB , µB , νB , PsB , PµB , PνB , ]
(A10)
where the implicit parameters are ωA, ωB (which for sim-
plicity we assume to be zero), and PωA = 1−PsA−PµA−
PνA and similarly PωB = 1 − PsB − PµB − PνB , and the
choice of signal states sA, sB versus the decoy states au-
tomatically implies basis choice, too. The above param-
eters are optimized using the same coordinate descent
algorithm as described in Ref. [13]. In Fig. 5, the dot-
dash line (fully asymmetric) optimizes all 12 parameters,
while the dashed line (signal-only asymmetric) optimizes
only 7 parameters (where all parameters except sA, sB
are identical for Alice and Bob):
[sA, µ, ν, Ps, Pµ, Pν , sB , µ, ν, Ps, Pµ, Pν ] (A11)
Performing coordinate descent on key rate versus pa-
rameters while estimating the yields with linear program-
12
ming is rather CPU-intensive. We have used a 40-core
(80-thread) machine (a single compute node in the Nia-
gara supercomputer [22], each node with dual 20-core In-
tel Skylake CPUs) to generate Fig. 5, where the OpenMP
multithreading library is used to parallelize the coordi-
nate descent algorithm (to accelerate the search along
each coordinate). The details of the algorithm can be
found in Ref. [13, 18]. Also, we used Gurobi [23], a
commercial linear program solver, to solve the linear pro-
gramming models. Linear programs sometimes introduce
multiple maxima, which means a local search on param-
eters sometimes might get trapped in a local maximum.
To alleviate this, we can start a local search from mul-
tiple random starting points, and pick the largest search
result, which can be viewed of as a form of global search.
(In principle, we can permutate the search results and
perform multiple iterations of random search using e.g.
an evolution algorithm [24], but here using one iteration
with multiple random starting points is usually sufficient
in finding a good key rate).
